Social Conflict in Rural China

hello misters and ladys:
Social conflict is the taboo of Chinese political discourse. With “an
overriding need for stability” and “a harmonious society” as the official policy
lines, the potential negative social and political impacts of social conflict
make it a highly sensitive topic in China. Thus, for academics, the subject
is a veritable mine field that most stay away from – resulting in a lack of
in-depth and systematic research on social conflict in China. This is evidenced
by the mainstream characterization of normal social conflict as pathological,
and thought better to be covered up out of a concern over negative political
consequences. Because social conflict is seen as a kind of social disease, its
legitimacy is often denied and the interests and needs of the relevant social
groups dismissed – particularly those disadvantaged groups that lie at the core
of conflict in society.
Rather than attempting to understand and address the roots of these
conflicts, Chinese leaders are more inclined to suppress them in order
to keep them out of the public eye. This mentality and practice not only
works to aggravate conflict, but also diminishes the legitimacy of the rulers
by contradicting their touting commitments to 'seek the truth from the
facts'. When the leadership fails in its commitments, the likelihood of social
turbulence breaking out in China increases. Conversely, while social action
and mobilization increase the risk of social upheaval, they have important
positive implications for social development. Understanding social conflict
and its root causes creates an opportunity to both proactively confront social
injustices and avert breakdowns in Chinese society.
In Chinese society today, large-scale conflicts are most likely to erupt in
rural versus urban areas. This is primarily due to a combination of the central
government’s inability to control the vast and remote areas of China, and the
lack of a clear set of common interests among the highly diverse populations
of rural China. In the past ten years, China has experienced a rapid period
of transition from a planned to a market economy. In the process, farmers’
economic interests have grown far more slowly than the national average.
This widening ‘wealth gap’ has made
social justice a focal issue for disgruntled
peasants. Peasant interests have also been
gravely impacted by the huge tide of land
appropriation in recent years.
In the next decade or two, China will
likely enter a period of frequent social
conflict. Peasants are likely to join hands with workers and members of the
lower intellectual class and confront the elitist alliance that dominates society,1
creating political, economic and social upheaval in China. To prevent social
unrest from triggering a revolution, it is imperative to address issues of social
injustice as well as create the effective channels for their expression. Such a
mechanism must be built upon fair constitutionalism and reform of the core
values in Chinese society.
Conflict in a Transitional Society
Social conflict theory holds that conflict arises when disparate social groups
clash over antagonistic interests. In an unjust system, the governed group
develops a sense of relative deprivation and unfairness, resulting in a loss of
political authority of the governing group.2 As the disadvantaged group grows
aware of the unequal distribution of limited resources, it is more likely to
rebel against the beneficiaries of the system.3 It is during social and economic
transition when these differences between social groups become most stark
and when there is a raised awareness of citizenship and political participation.
In addition, the government’s inability to meet the changing expectations
and demands can lead to the merging of interests among dissatisfied groups
and mobilize large numbers of people. Increasing collective awareness and
suspicion about the fairness of resource distribution amounts to a greater challenge
to ruler’s legitimacy and increases the likelihood of conflict. Under these
unstable circumstances, a sudden deterioration in economic, social, political
or environmental conditions can spark large-scale chaos. An example of how
this can play out is the political and social turmoil in Southeast Asian countries
triggered by the financial crisis in 1997.
For China, the Tiananmen Incident on June 4, 1989 highlights a significant
shift in social conflict. Up to that time, social conflict in China appeared
as a ‘constructive struggle for political power’, and was largely dominated by
intellectual elites. Despite the continuing hostility to China’s authoritarian
regime by some radical intellectuals in the following years, the protests of
1989 marked the end of open confrontation between intellectual elites and
the political elites (rulers). Most intellectual elites, under intense political pressure
and by the persuasion of “enlightened” political elites, came to accept the
reality that they could not change the regime at this time. Deng Xiaoping’s
tour of southern China in 1992 reinstated
economic growth as the country’s firm
path ahead. Along with this event, the
enthusiasm of intellectual elite opposition
dissipated as they were themselves co-opted
by increasing business opportunities. Those
who maintained political aspirations found
more inroads into China’s power system as long as they recognized the current
regime. However, by the end of the 20th century, a new exclusive form of rule
had emerged in China and with it, a new phase of social conflict resulting
from the neglect of the poor and disadvantaged – characterized by a reactive
approach and organized around a defense of rights, primarily led by workers
and peasants.
An ‘elitist alliance’ has emerged during this new phase: a combination of
political elites (government), economic elites (business professionals) and
intellectual elites (academia and culture).4 This group legitimately enjoys
the benefits of China’s economic achievements through a ‘revolving door’.
As the government emphasizes ‘knowledge-based’ (zhishihua) requirements
or minimum educational level for its officials, many intellectual elites have
entered positions of political power. Similarly, political elites have set up businesses
(xiahai) or have become guanshang (establishing business while holding
office). In 2002, the 16th Party Congress paved the way for economic elites to
become political elites, giving the former greater identity with political power.5
A common interest binds the three groups together to form a relatively stable
Chinese ruling class with a broad base.
On the other side of the equation are the workers and peasants, who,
because of their poverty, are suppressed by strong political forces and are on
the whole, excluded from economic, political and intellectual life. They are
increasingly marginalized and have become a socially disadvantaged group.
Most intellectual elites have joined the elitist alliance and no longer speak on
behalf of the lower classes. Peasants and workers have no true representation of
their interests in the formal political process and have been unable to organize
themselves to fight for a common interest.6
The juxtaposition of the elitist alliance vis-a-vis the disadvantaged group
is characterized by ‘rigid stability’. The former gains power through the accumulation
of political, economic and social resources and then institute
higher barriers for other groups wanting to share their power.7 This exclusive
arrangement becomes a one-way exchange as the elitist alliance gains from the
success of China’s development while the price for peasants and workers wanting
to enter this group is too high. With the skewing of resource allocation,
the disadvantaged group finds themselves increasingly reliant on the elitist
alliance for their survival. The marginalization of workers and peasants is thus
becoming irreversible in China’s society.
Under the banner of development, China has witnessed an unprecedented
growth of its economy at the cost of social justice.8 This contradiction has ushered
in a new stage of social resistance whereby the increasingly marginalized
workers and peasants are standing up for their rights. The frequency of social
conflicts is testimony to this growing trend, with the number of incidents
of peasant/worker unrest rapidly increasing since 1999. China experienced
8,709 such incidents in 1993 but by 1999, they had exploded to over 32,000.
The figure for 2005 was in excess of 87,000.9
Resistance by Legal Means
Forms of peasant unrest have been changing during the 1990s. Prior to
trivial disputes.10 After 1998, Chinese peasants’ resistance became far more
organized and over greater stakes. Their speakers or representatives are often
demobilized soldiers, retired government officials who chose to spend their
remaining years in the countryside and former village cadres. These individuals
have clear political beliefs and understand how to motivate other peasants
and directly challenge government agencies at the grassroots level through
legal channels.
The representatives of the peasants form the core of an ‘underground’ organization
to defend peasants’ interests. They are loose in structure and bound
mainly by commitments to morality and justice. Formerly, they concentrated
on tasks such as reducing the tax burdens of peasants and protecting villagers’
voting rights.11 In recent years, however, these organizations have come to protect
peasants’ land rights as local governments and land developers increasingly
appropriate the peasants’ land without due compensation. Their fundamental
belief is that peasants’ interests and rights are violated because governments
at the local level are not enforcing laws nor implementing policies devised by
the central government.12 This form of resistance uses the state’s own laws to
achieve its ends and thus reveals a more clear understanding of the abstract
‘legitimate rights and interests’ or ‘citizens’ rights’ of peasants.13
China utilizes a socialist system of land ownership, where land is either
owned by the state or collectively owned by the working masses. Peasant farmers
do not own land and are entitled only the right to use land.14 A constitutional
amendment passed by the People’s Congress in March 2004 stipulated that
the state can legally appropriate land
and take back the land-use rights from
peasants, but must compensate for such
appropriation. With the high economic
growth and rapid urbanization, an enormous
amount of farm land has been
requisitioned, particularly in rural areas
bordering big cities. As the government
is technically both owner of the land and administer of its use (and often a
developer itself ), the appropriation of land is not supervised, resulting in frequent
abuse.15 Many local governments use any and all means to kick peasants
off the land so that it can be converted it into industrial and business zones.
Although there are clear details regarding the level and scope of compensation
that should be given according to law, the majority of peasants are ignorant
of their rights and usually receive far lower compensation than a fair market
value of the land. To add insult to injury, without a sufficient social safety net
to fall back on once their land is taken, they are left in an extremely vulnerable
position, often with their survival at stake. Local governments care about little
outside their own interests; the lower the compensation to farmers for their
land, the more profits they pocket.16 Local governments often don’t even have
a sound plan for developing the land but just want to occupy as much as they
can knowing its potential worth. The upshot has been a huge waste of fertile
farm lands that are left abandoned after being appropriated from the peasants
that till it. Therefore, land disputes – more than any crisis in the past – make
conflict in the rural areas more explosive and violent than ever.
In addition to centering on land disputes, social conflict in China’s countryside
has also taken on new characteristics. First, participants in social conflict
no longer only include peasants but also village-level government cadres, as
they are both victims in land appropriation cases.17 Their ‘enemies’ on the
other hand, have upgraded to include municipal and county governments,
real estate developers and administrators of economic development zones.
Second, previous rural conflicts that centered on tax burden disputes took
place mainly in poorer, central China. Land-rights disputes are primarily in
developed regions and the coastal provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong,
Shandong and Hebei, where urbanization and industrialization has led to a
bigger appetite for land.
Thirdly, in the past, peasants mainly resorted to shangfang (petitioning
high-level government authorities to appeal against unfair local governments
behavior), or propagandizing their cause and refusing to pay taxes.
In land-rights disputes, however, they choose demonstrations, parades, or
other forms of civil disruption including sit-ins (jingzuo) at the doorstep of
government buildings or on highways and railways to obstruct the flow of key
transportation.18
Confrontations between peasants and local governments have become
explosive, especially with the growing involvement of police. In the past,
the central government explicitly prohibited the use of force in constraining
peasants’ protesting tax burdens. Therefore, except in a few cases, large-scale
incidents between the police and peasants were rare. Disputes over land have
taken on far higher stakes for all sides, making the differences between parties
far more polarized and intractable. As a result, the local government often re-
sorts to the use of massive police force – in some incidents hundreds of police
– to constrain those displaced peasants who are defending their rights. Results
from 87 incident studies since 2004 have shown that several hundred peasants
have been injured, three killed, over 160 detained and a number were tied
up and paraded around in an attempt to publicly humiliate them.19 Peasants
were punished under the ‘crime’ of “disturbing public order”, obstruction of
public services and illegal gathering. Some local governments even resorted to
falsely accusing peasants petitioning the provincial and central government as
Falungong members.20
Finally, peasants have sought help outside their environments from intellectuals,
legal professionals and non governmental organizations (NGO) that
provide free legal support and other advice. Because of the intervention of
these external actors, land-rights disputes have taken on political significance
and in some cases were resolved in favor of the peasants.21 A Beijing-based
NGO aided peasants in preparing a massive petition by 20,000 displaced
farmers to punish the Communist Party secretary of Tangshan city in Hebei
Province. Similar initiatives have been taken with the NGO’s help in several
other cities and provinces.
Peasants’ Contribution to Political Development
During the past decade, peasants have become China’s disadvantaged
group. They are both relentlessly exploited economically and deprived of
political rights and they lack true representation in China’s official political
participation process.22 Under China’s current governance, the strength of the
state takes precedence over the rights of citizens and a law-based system. Thus,
while peasant resistance is legally acknowledged, it is politically prohibited.23
Nevertheless, the resistance by peasants and defense of their rights have made
an important contribution to the protection of citizen rights and the reshaping
of governmental behaviors and attitudes in China.
Leaders are feeling the heat from these peasant activities and have begun
to adjust policies to accommodate their demands. This change is not due to
a sudden moral awareness or compassion for the miserable plight of peasants.
Rather, it is because peasants’ direct confrontation of local governments has
shaken the foundations of governance of this nation.24 In 1985, the central government
still framed the tax burden dispute as an “exceptional factor that has
harmed relations between the party and the people, workers and peasants…”25
By 1993, the central government had issued executive orders explicitly stating
that “reducing the peasants’ tax burdens is no longer a purely economic issue,
but a political problem” and urged local governments to treat it as such.26 The
volume was turned up again in 1996 when the central government announced
“the reduction of tax burdens on peasants is an extremely urgent political
task.”27 In short, pressure from the bottom has affected government priorities
at the top, as those in power have realized the political consequences of not
addressing these pressing needs.28
Peasants engaged in defending their interests have also successfully changed
the conduct of local governments in many respects, making political consultation
in rural areas possible. Because the political authority and legitimacy of
local governments comes from their connection to the central government,
this strategy has been very effective. The peasants use laws, regulations and
orders by the central government as the standard by which to measure local
governments’ behavior. In this way, the peasants have actually played the role of
oversight of local governments giving the former a substantial political power
– a reality that local governments must factor in when making decisions.29
Local governments have traditionally used harsh measures (and even
criminal elements) to persecute peasants or their representatives who dare
to challenge their authority.30 Instead of putting out the fire, however local
governments have been burned themselves as such tactics increasingly instigate
mass peasant resistance, forcing the central government to intervene. By
supporting the peasants, the central government has gained their respect, but
it has also given them a confidence and belief that their activities are justified
and legitimate. It has created a reinforcing effect as the representatives of the
peasants have become heroes, drawing even more peasants to their cause. In
rural areas, where peasant representatives or elites are powerful, local governments
have little choice but to hold consultations with these former enemies
in hopes that the latter can help persuade the peasants to implement some
policy favored by the local officials.
Perhaps most interestingly, these peasants activities are enlightening intellectual
elites on the theme of citizens’ rights, which has become the channel of
shifting political discourse in China.31 In the 21st century, as Chinese society
enters a time of potential crisis caused by unemployment and peasant land
disputes, these intellectual elites are gradually forming a consensus around the
need for a “new enlightenment” movement. As it evolves, intellectual elites
are attempting to rationalize and define the societal changes that are unfold-
ing through their own lens – often by borrowing Western terms and ideas.
However, grafting foreign concepts onto the historical and political context
of China’s reality often negatively effects society. China’s modern history has
experienced this before. Intellectual elites, who are co-opted by the elites in
power, monopolize the discourse over society’s rights and interests, often leading
to the neglect of the majority of citizens – mainly workers and peasants
– who then fall between the cracks and become disadvantaged.
Now, the peasants are rewriting history. For the past decade, it is they who
have been educating China’s intellectual elites and influencing the government.
While some vanguard intellectuals are raising the rhetorical banner of
constitutionalism – democracy and citizens’ rights – the Chinese peasants have
already been acting on their demand for legitimate rights for several years. Few
have understood the extent and the gravity of the social problems in China.
Fewer still have recognized the power of these bottom-up changes that are
occurring and which offer the greatest hope for resolving the contradictions
in the rural areas.
This movement by China’s rural citizens has also worked to transform the
peasants themselves. They have gained political experience and fostered a
group of leaders and representatives through their long struggle to defend their
legitimate rights. In their efforts to reduce their tax burden, farmers first tried
to rebel against the unfair taxation without breaking the law. In their fight over
land-use rights, however, they began to actively use the law itself to defend
not only their own statutory rights but also those of others.32 That transition
has marked a significant political shift with high symbolic value. Currently,
peasants’ actions have taken on a more rational and less violent form because
they are clearly more organized and have more confidence in their strength.
This is an important indication of a raised awareness of the rights and status of
Chinese peasants. They are increasingly aware of the influence of their struggle
for not just their own individual rights, but the fate of the rural community
as a whole. Such realizations have led peasant mobilization to pursue broader
and higher goals.
This has significantly widened the scope of their actions. To a great extent,
Chinese peasants’ pursuit has become the defense of a more abstract notion of
the dignity of law. It is foreseeable that political participation in making laws
or through legislative action will become the next goal for Chinese peasants. If
that succeeds, the nature of China’s grassroots-level politics will be profoundly
changed.
Averting Revolution
The existence of deep socioeconomic rifts in society (poverty, racism,
exploitation) does not necessarily guarantee large-scale mass protests or revolution.
33 However, a collapse of China’s social institutions will loom in the
future if it fails to provide an effective channel of expression for the grievances
of disadvantaged groups in society or fails to establish a mechanism to balance
diverse social interests as the gap between the rich and poor continues to
widen. If China’s problems of socioeconomic equality in rural China are left
to fester, revolution may indeed be unavoidable.
Whether confrontation between peasants (with workers) and the elitist
group will lead to a social crisis or even a revolution will be determined by
many unpredictable factors.34 First and foremost is how China’s leaders deal
with the movement by these groups to defend their legitimate rights. Currently,
this movement exists as political pressure on the government, but how much
pressure can it tolerate? If pushed beyond its limits, the stress of such political
pressure could tip the balance of stability in China. The moderates in the
government who are sympathetic to the peasants’ cause could either change
their stand and side with hardliners, or completely split with them to support
peasants and workers. Either result could lead to a revolution in national
politics. The most effective release-valve for this pressure is governance by rule
of law.
Looking to the past will shed light on how China’s present leadership can use
the current crisis to carry out appropriate reforms.35 In the late 1970s, Chinese
peasants instinctually rebelled against the socialist system that was plagued by
incessant political upheaval. Deng Xiaoping and other open-minded leaders
recognized the root of social conflict at that time and used it to drive the rural
reform, which linked peasants’ remuneration to productivity under the land
contract system. A grave test for the current Chinese leadership headed by Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao – and their successors – is not unlike that of Deng and
his contemporaries. They must also recognize the unique root cause of the
social conflict of the present time and adapt China’s rural policy to accommodate
peasants’ political demands.
The most important political image the current Chinese leadership has built
so far can be described as “reaching out to the common people” (qinmin) and
respecting the common people’s wishes. Some in academia have coined this
new image as “new populism” and at its core is the protection of civil rights.36
However, an image is not enough to sooth the peasants’ grievances. The leadership
needs to recognize the peasants’ defense of their rights as legitimate, as
a demand for political participation and consultation within the mainstream
political institution.
Secondly, will the policies of a “benevolent government” (renzheng) carried
out by the Hu-Wen administration be acceptable to the privileged ruling
group? They tout being “close to the common people” and their policies
have begun to cater to those poor and disadvantaged by acknowledging their
legitimate rights and seeking to improve their wellbeing.37 This has won them
support from peasants and workers, however, such policies haven’t really been
acknowledged by the privileged group as it has not yet significantly impacted
them. This group holds huge interests in the fortune it has amassed through
the ‘old power’ or the privileged status in the old communist power structure.
In a growing economy, and under the still fairly moderate policies of the Hu-
Wen administration regarding solutions to the rural unrest, these privileged
elites may yet bring enormous pressure to bear on the Hu-Wen administration
as their interests become increasingly challenged.
Thirdly is the question of whether the central government can maintain stability
between peasants and the local governments (and other interest groups).
Undoubtedly, the Hu-Wen administration faces many complex dilemmas
here as well. Primarily, the difficulty will come in balancing the contradictory
interests of the elitist alliance with the poor and disadvantaged. As China
continues to grow, a demand for land resources will only intensify and land
can only come from the peasants’ hands; the calculus is zero-sum. To protect
the private property ownership, China recently passed the property law in
2007, which may intensify struggles between peasants and their “enemies”
– local governments and land developers.
Other factors of instability also persist as the central government’s authority
is absorbed by the increasingly independent local governments who pursue
their own agendas. The central government is stymied by local authorities who
often pay lip service to the central government’s policy but covertly sabotage
it. The central government has fairly comprehensive directives for all levels of
local governments, such as to strictly control the sale of land. Yet, many local
governments feel uninhibited and appropriate peasants’ land willfully without
proper compensation.38 The rise of harsher punishments doled out by the
central government to curtail such behavior will invariably lead to conflict
with local governments.
Finally, can the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintain its own identity
and ideology while contradictions continue to rend the fabric of Chinese
society? If not, what does that mean for China? The CCP’s historical ideology
and legitimacy declares that the “workers are the ruling class” and “peasants are
allies”(of the ruling class). Yet, the capitalists’ status has been raised far more
in the past decades of reform. The nation is entering a stage of being a well-off
society while hundreds of millions of peasants and workers cannot make ends
meet. This gap between reality and professed ideology will inevitably shake
the political root of the CCP’s ideology and stability of its rule. Avoiding the
escalation of social conflict will require, at a minimum, a better protection of
the fundamental rights and interests of all citizens, particularly workers and
peasants. This will entail, above all, a fairer and more equal sharing of the
benefits of China’s rise to prosperity.